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Ukraine, shaken by a deep political crisis, has recently experienced at least two developments that are
rather demonstrative of the current political process. The key event, the massive protest action at the
Kyiv main square, Maidan Nezalezhnosti, on February 6 was part of the «Ukraine without Kuchma»
initiative and the (interim) culmination of the protest action started last December. The action was a
joint effort of 30+ Ukrainian political parties and nongovernmental organizations. Like in the
December 2000 protest, the core of the action was formed by the Socialist party, the Socialist Youth
Congress, the UNA-UNSO, the Ukrainian Comsomol, the Ukrainian Conservative Republican party,
the Sobor, the Ukrainian Republican party, now joined by the Batkivshchyna and the Ukrainian
People's Rukh.
The February 6 protest action was joined by about 10 thousand people (as estimated by the Ukrainian
State Radio UR-1, though the Ukrainian State Television, UT-1, referred to «only» 2 thousand later
that day). According to the Militia, about 5 thousand people took part in the march and the pickets.
Commenting on the protesters' demands, one of their coordinators Volodymyr Chemerys said:
«Generally, our demands have not changed. Our key demand is the resignation of the President and the
dismissal of the «force ministers» (UR-1, February 6, 2001). The action in the late afternoon, lit by
burning newspaper pages bearing a picture of someone in a prisoner's robe, with Kuchma's face,
culminated in the burning of a life-size puppet, symbolizing the president's figure.
Interestingly, covering the action, most of the Ukrainian media found it too difficult for themselves to
provide full yet unbiased and clear information from the site. The deliberately shifted focus and rather
aggressive definitions addressed to the participants from the national television screens were not
unusual. «Observers believe that everything that has taken place in the capital's center looked like a
well-orchestrated performance,» the major state-owned national channel, UT-1, was telling the nation a
few hours after the event.
Another major channel, ICTV, formally independent but controlled by insiders of President Kuchma's
closer circle, chose to appeal to a rather controversial historic analogy: «What has happened in the
Khreshchatyk [street] was somewhat similar in its pick-and-mix diversity to the Koliyivshchyna,» the
news program said on February 6. The comparison is a rather sensitive and dangerous one, for it
represents a classical attempt to provoke viewers to develop a strongly negative association sequence:
the bloodshed of the Koliyivshchyna, a violent peasants' revolt in the XVIII century and the recent
developments, when thousands of dissatisfied people gathered in the center of Kyiv. Such references
can only fuel the confrontation. «Participants of the rally proceeded to the action that was the reason for
which they had gathered: first they burned special issues of the Tovarishch newspaper and then burned
a scarecrow dressed in a robe that they had brought with themselves,» the INTER TV news program
said, desperate to avoid any mention of what was actually printed in the newspaper and what the
protesters burned.
The state-owned television (UT-1) never gave the floor to the protesters themselves and never
mentioned the contents of their demands. «Speeches by politicians who are followers of different
ideologies, who have not been seen together for many years… While in addition to the «against» there
were some calls «for» - for the dream about Ukraine, dreams differ,» the TV spot argued. Given the
fact that the protesters could not voice their «dreams», the information looked biased and carefully self-
censored. Meanwhile, such coverage may work to restore the old Soviet-time habit of reading
(listening) between the lines and interpreting the official version to the opposite, and regarding the
opposite to be true. Hence, the strictly limited and filtered nationwide coverage may only add to the
deepening perception of the political developments as a major crisis on the verge of a catastrophe.
Similarly, referring to the opposition and participants of the action as «adventurers» is
counterproductive, as it hinders prospects for a realistic transparent dialogue between the executive
branch and the part of the society that is in opposition to the current power-holders. Hence, the question
is whether the power-holders need such a dialogue, whether the opposition needs it, and whether the
society is prepared to demand it.
Another remarkably political development of the past week - this time the evolution of the «Ukraine
without Kuchma» street action into the parliamentary and political event - was the establishment of the
«Public Initiative of the National Salvation Forum» on February 9, 2001. The Forum, joined by a
number of MPs and Ukrainian politicians including the Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz, Serhiy
Holovatyi, leader of the Sobor Anatoly Matvienko, mayor of Cherkasy Volodymyr Oliynyk, leaders of
the Batkivshchyna Yulia Tymoshenko and Oleksandr Turchynov, Rukh member and a new recruit of
the Reforms and Order faction in the parliament Taras Chornovil, Volodymyr Chemerys, leader of the
Ukrainian Conservative Republican party Stepan Khmara, approved a 15-strong council to coordinate
its efforts and announced that the new formation would unite about 70 prominent Ukrainian politicians
and press for resignation of Kuchma The Forum's strategic goal, stipulated in the «manifesto»,
approved by the Forum participants, is to «[p]ut an end to the criminal regime, reinforce truth and the
rule of law, and bring Ukraine back to the European way of development». The opposition is in the
process of formulating the strategy of achieving that goal. According to the opposition, there is a need
for «changing the current system of power in Ukraine by means of massive actions within «Ukraine
without Kuchma», legislative activity in the parliament of Ukraine, as well as by means of using
foreign political levers of influence on the political situation in Ukraine» (www.korespondent.net,
February 9, 2001). The first session of the Forum was led by Taras Chornovil who defined the tactical
objective of the mixed situational opposition: «a velvet revolution in Ukraine».
Other participants of the multiparty opposition block were remarkably unanimous in their views.
Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz stated Ukraine needed to be transformed into a parliamentary-
presidential or a parliamentary republic, and Leonid Kuchma be removed from office. Moroz called on
the Forum participants to support the «Ukraine without Kuchma» initiative and provide for the legal
implementation of their intentions by means of amending the Constitution and urging the international
community to use its influence on the processes through diplomatic channels. Offering her view on the
purpose of the new Forum, Yulia Tymoshenko defined it as «giving people hope for change for the
better and building a democratic state.»
Assessing prospects of the new forum, its participants suggest not focusing on differences between the
represented political parties, as the Forum would consist of «personalities, not parties». The provision
is meant to reduce the ideological differences between supporters of the left (for instance, Socialists led
by Oleksandr Moroz) and those of the right (Taras Chornovil) who take part in the new Forum as
equals. Apparently, the emphasis on «personalities, not parties» is also meant to reduce negative effects
of accusing them of being a «pick-and-mix» collection of political leaders involved in the «Ukraine
without Kuchma» initiative.
Interestingly, the declared shared goal appears to be «strategic», at least for today, for a broad variety
of leaders representing different political forces. Tactical steps towards achieving that goal are seen
primarily as political actions and also tend to receive support of the opposition politicians. Hence, as
Taras Chornovil noted, a consolidated opposition block has been formed of representatives of different
political forces, and the fact is «the best proof that the people has grown up to forming the single front
against the evil» (www.ufs.kiev.ua, February 9, 2001).
The new formation cannot but raise an important issue: are we witnessing - probably for the first time
in Ukraine's contemporary history - the process of emergence of a genuine consolidated opposition like
the one present in democracies? With a coherent agenda, transparent political rules of the game and
realistic alternatives? Or are we seeing yet another version of the «opposition Ukrainian style»,
specifically «constructive», i.e., prepared to collaborate with the state machine and join governmental
structures when relevant invitations are made? It was not a rare case that some political party officials
were closely integrated into the power structure and occupied decision-making positions, but publicly
defined themselves as representatives of the «opposition». Some of them were particularly inclined to
engage in separate negotiations with the state structures, bargaining for comfortable seats and political
favors. In fact, a number of those who has joined the opposition nowadays had some (sometimes rather
productive) collaboration experience. The «constructive opposition» has been made possible by the
tradition of «political cronyism», shaped during the communist times and never destroyed, but slightly
modified with free market elements and democratic declarations.
So far the Ukrainian opposition has displayed a specific feature that made it different from a
democratic opposition elsewhere: it has not provided clear alternative answers to the questions asked
by the society, and it has not offered an understandable, well-prepared and realistic action plan.
Similarly, the opposition has not formulated expected outcomes of the implementation of their agenda,
and the costs/benefits of taking/not taking the proposed actions. However, this seems to be true for any
of Ukrainian political aspirants. The government has rarely had specific answers to the above questions
either. For the decade of Ukraine's independent statehood, no clear, transparent and enforceable criteria
of political responsibility for political decisions and actions have been formulated. So far the opposition
in Ukraine tended to be a mirror reflection of the ruling establishment. Due to the general
underdevelopment of the political system and inconsistency of the emergence democratic
transformations, not only the state power structures but also the opposition have tended to act
sporadically, following the informal and frequently modified political «rules of the game». Hence, it is
not surprising that so far Ukraine has not had any «normal», credible and able opposition that would
not only declare «fighting the bandocracy regime» but would also offer understandable and effective
initiatives that would be supported by the society as able to improve the situation in the country. In
such case, the proposed alternatives will be regularly evaluated by the society and judged by means of
free and fair elections.
Nowadays, given the political crisis and contradictions that gradually drive the Ukrainian power
establishment to the deadlock, the newly established opposition has a chance to develop into a strong
democratic force. Nowadays none of the leaders of the new opposition occupied a seat in any
governmental structure; they have only parliamentary levers of influence. Therefore, the «velvet
revolution» in the streets will probably be made in the Ukrainian parliament as well. If done
consistently, the efforts may further undermine the declared parliamentary «majority» and contribute to
its «velvet evolution» in the pro-opposition way. The evolution may be made easier by the fact that at
least two leaders of the new opposition Forum, Oleksandr Moroz and Yulia Tymoshenko, control two
parliamentary factions, one of which, the Batkivshchyna, is part of the majority and is unlikely to
withdraw at least until there is a pending criminal case against Tymoshenko. Some other leaders of the
opposition Forum also belong to the parliamentary majority and, therefore, their actions can be both
constructive and destructive. On the destructive side, they may be able to block the adoption of some
bills, primarily the four Codes planned to be approved by the 7th Session of the Verkhovna Rada.
While the opposition's reaction to the law-making process may be influenced by its members' political
sentiments for Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko who may convince them to refrain from blocking the
law-making activities at least as long as the draft bills proposed by the government are concerned, the
«evolution» of the majority is likely to become a complicated though irreversible process. Furthermore,
the planned initiation of the impeachment procedure and expected implementation of amendments to
the Constitution may effectively paralyze any other law-making activity and smoothly transform into a
new election campaign.
Therefore, apart from emotions and declarations, does the new opposition have alternative answers to
critical issues faced by the society, and a clear action plan instead of slogans? If so, it will have to
develop differently from the «shadow cabinet» schemes once built by the Hromada party that
disappeared from the political arena with the withdrawal of Yulia Tymoshenko and Oleksandr
Turchynov and particularly the departure of Pavlo Lazarenko. That way was explored in 1998-1999
and proved to be counterproductive for both the party and some of its founders and leaders. In order to
avoid making the same mistakes, the new opposition should consider substituting manifestos with
realistic action plans, learn some team work and survive till the next political Monday -
notwithstanding the winter, it is likely to be the hot one.
